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Introduction 
 
This chapter aims, first, to offer a brief account of the policy statements issued by intergovernmental 
bodies that appeal to human dignity; second, to focus on those specifically dealing with bioethics; third, 
to discuss the cultural challenges that arise from the adoption of ‘universal’ or ‘transcultural’ 
understandings of human dignity; fourth, to attempt to respond to the objection that human dignity and 
human rights standards are mere products of Western culture and are therefore inapplicable to other 
regions of the world. 
 
1. Human dignity: a key concept of international human rights law 
 
Although the notion of human dignity has a very long history in philosophy, it has re-emerged with great 
vigour after the Second World War as an international legal and political concept which aims to stress 
the need for unconditional respect for every human being in the most different areas of social life. It was 
indeed in response to the horrors of that tragic period of history that the international community felt it 
necessary to emphasize the idea that every individual has inherent worth and accompanying rights in 
order to prevent “barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind” from ever happening 
again (Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, thereafter UDHR). Indeed, 
simultaneously with the end of the Second World War, the Member States of the newly created United 
Nations reaffirmed their “faith (…) in the dignity and worth of the human person” (Preamble of the 
United Nations Charter 1945). Subsequently, the UNDH served as the cornerstone of the new 
international human rights system which was grounded on the “recognition of the inherent dignity and of 
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family” (UDHR, Preamble). From the very 
beginning, the Declaration puts forward that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights” (Article 1) and that, for that reason, “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment” (Article 5).  
There is a widely agreed view among scholars that the emphasis on human dignity that dominates the 
ethical and political discourse since 1945 can be to a large extent explained by the horror caused by the 
revelations that prisoners of concentration camps, including children, were used by Nazi physicians as 
subjects of brutal experiments. In this regard, the American bioethicist Robert Baker asserts that the 
UDHR was in part informed by the discoveries of these abuses, which led in 1947 to the development of 
the Nuremberg Code by the trial that condemned the Nazi physicians. Baker claims that “the details 
revealed daily at Nuremberg gave content to the rights recognized by Articles 4 through 20 of the 
Declaration” (Baker 2001: 241-252). In other words, both modern medical ethics and international human 
rights law emerged simultaneously from the same tragic events and are conceptually much closer than 
usually assumed. Similarly, George J. Annas (2005: 160) points out that “World War II was the crucible 
in which both human rights and bioethics were forged, and they have been related by blood ever since.”  
Even if the Nuremberg Code does not explicitly include the expression ‘human dignity’, there is no 
doubt that this notion lies at the background of its ten principles, which are presented as non-negotiable. 
This is very significant as it puts in evidence that the idea of an unconditional human worthiness was in 
the mind of the judges that formulated the ten principles, and that, in their view, the rules governing 
medical research should be based on categorical, and not on merely utilitarian grounds. In this respect, 
Jay Katz (1992: 227) says that: 
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“The Nuremberg Code is a remarkable document. Never before in the history of human 
experimentation, and never since, has any code or any regulation of research declared in such 
relentless and uncompromising a fashion that the psychological integrity of research subjects must be 
protected absolutely”(emphasis is ours).  
 
As mentioned above, simultaneously with the development of the Nuremberg Code, the international 
community made an unprecedented political move with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which would become the cornerstone of the international human rights system. A brief 
excursus into the drafting history of this founding instrument will be helpful to clarify how its intellectual 
authors conceived the role of human dignity. There has been long debate among scholars about the 
relative importance of John Humphrey and René Cassin ―the Canadian and the French representatives 
respectively― in the drafting of the Declaration. Even if there is no doubt that Humphrey played a key 
role in the first draft of the document, it seems well that the incorporation of the concept of human dignity 
was due not to him but to Cassin, who introduced corrections to Humphrey’s text. The inclusion of 
dignity was initially controversial, even if it had already been incorporated into the Preamble of the UN 
Charter. Humphrey himself considered that the reference to dignity did not add anything to his draft and 
that its incorporation as Article 1 of the Declaration was merely rhetoric (McCrudden 2008: 677). For 
others, however, it was a vital attempt to articulate their understanding of the basis on which human rights 
could be said to exist. In her detailed account of the history of the UDHR, Mary Ann Glendon (2002: 
146) recalls how, when the South African representative questioned the use of the term dignity, Eleanor 
Roosevelt, who was chairing the commission that drafted the Declaration, argued that it was included “in 
order to emphasize that every human being is worthy of respect… it was meant to explain why human 
beings have to rights to begin with.”  
Consistently with this understanding, the two great support pillars to the Declaration, namely the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), both of 1966, solemnly affirm that human rights “derive 
from the inherent dignity of the human person.” Thus, human dignity is regarded in international law as 
the foundation of human rights; people are recognized as rights bearers because their lives and their 
flourishing as persons are viewed as having intrinsic worth. Actually, to talk about persons having rights 
would not make any sense unless moral value is previously attached to the very core of human 
personhood (Black 2000: 131). But dignity does not only precede human rights as their source; it also 
follows then as it embodies their raison d’être. Indeed, the recognition of basic rights does not have 
ultimately any other aim than that of securing the fundamental conditions for each human being leading a 
minimally good life (Nickel 1987). Therefore it can be said that rights are simultaneously grounded on 
dignity and aim to promote dignity. 
If dignity (and not merely contingent agreement) is the foundation of human rights, then it is 
understandable that compliance with human rights norms is mandatory rather than discretionary. 
Certainly, the practical efficacy of promoting and protecting human rights is significantly aided by their 
legal recognition by individual states. But the ultimate validity of human rights is characteristically 
thought of as not conditional upon such recognition (Nickel 1987), and this is so because they are 
grounded on the inherent dignity of every human being. In other words, legal norms do not create 
individuals’ rights from nothing; human rights are not the capricious invention of domestic lawmakers or 
of the international community, which could legitimately revoke them in a change of humour. Rather, 
both individual states and the international community are morally obliged to recognize that all people 
have basic rights (ie. that they have equally valid claims to basic goods) because they derive from the 
dignity which is inherent in every human being. The explicit use of the verb “to recognize” in the UDHR, 
which denotes the formal acknowledgment of something that already exists, is very illuminating in this 
respect.  
It is true that human dignity is never clearly defined in international law. Such a thing would be as 
difficult as trying to define ‘freedom,’ ‘justice’ or whatever other key social value. In any case, this lack 
of definition does not entail that dignity is a merely formal or empty concept, or a purely rhetorical 
notion. It is not because it is too poor, but because it is too rich that it cannot be encapsulated into a 
definition. In reality, its core meaning is quite clear and simple and embodies a very basic requirement of 
justice towards people. Such requirement means, in the words of Rawls, that “each person possesses an 
inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override” (1973: 3). 
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2. Human dignity in the intergovernmental instruments relating to bioethics 
 
As mentioned above, the need to put some limits to research involving human subjects played a decisive 
role in the renewed importance of the idea of human dignity. In this regard it is very revealing that the 
only provision of the ICCPR which directly deals with bioethical issues is the one relating to medical 
research. According to Article 7, “no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or 
scientific experimentation.” Twenty years after the Nuremberg Code, this article is still like an echo of 
that historical trial decision. More importantly, it enshrines for the first time in history the requirement of 
free consent for medical research in an international binding instrument. 
Between the end of the 1970s and the end of the 1990s, the recourse to human dignity in relation to 
medicine went beyond the field of medical research and began to be applied to very different practices, 
especially those that operate at the edges of life, like abortion, embryo research, preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis, futile treatments, assisted suicide and euthanasia. In this varied context, it is not surprising if 
the term dignity was sometimes used to support different and even opposed views. Simultaneously, the 
concept began also to be employed to criticize what was regarded as new forms of commodification of 
the human body, like organ selling and surrogate motherhood.  
This broad and multifaceted function of human dignity is visible in the intergovernmental 
instruments adopted since the end of the 90’s such as the UNESCO Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and Bioethics of 2005 and, at the European level, the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine of 1997 (also known as “Oviedo Convention”). Both instruments, which can be regarded as 
an extension of international human rights law into the field of biomedicine, confer on the notion of 
human dignity the status of an overarching principle, that is, of an ultimate and general standard that is 
called to guide the normative regulation of the whole biomedical field (Andorno 2009). 
The UNESCO Universal Declaration of Bioethics and Human Rights of 2005 is unequivocal in this 
regard, as the promotion of respect for human dignity embodies not only the key purpose of the document 
(Article 2.c), but also the first principle governing the whole field of biomedicine (Article 3), the main 
argument every form of against discrimination, including for instance, genetic discrimination (Article 11), 
the framework within which cultural diversity is to be respected (Article 12), and the highest interpretive 
principle of all the provisions of the Declaration (Article 28).  
The Oviedo Convention is another good example of the key role that human dignity is beginning to 
play in this field. The Explanatory Report to the Convention states that “the concept of human dignity (...) 
constitutes the essential value to be upheld. It is at the basis of most of the values emphasized in the 
Convention” (Paragraph 9). Recalling the history of the European document, one of the members of the 
drafting group recognizes that “it was soon decided that the concept of dignity, identity and integrity of 
human beings/individuals should be both the basis and the umbrella for all other principles and notions 
that were to be included in the Convention” (Kits Nieuwenkamp 2000: 329). The Preamble refers three 
times to dignity: the first, when it recognizes “the importance of ensuring the dignity of the human 
being“; the second, when it recalls that “the misuse of biology and medicine may lead to acts endangering 
human dignity”; the third, when it expresses the resolution of taking the necessary measures “to safeguard 
human dignity and the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual with regard to the application of 
biology and medicine.” More importantly, the purpose itself of the Convention is defined in Article 1 by 
appealing to the notion of human dignity.  
At the end of the 1990’s the notion of human dignity began also to be used with a secondary (or 
derivative) meaning which goes far beyond the worthiness of individuals and aims to stress the need to 
protect the integrity and identity of humankind as such against some potential biotechnological 
developments like reproductive cloning and germline interventions. These two procedures appear indeed 
to jeopardize basic features of the human species and our understanding of what it means to be human, in 
particular our interest in having an open future.  
In the case of reproductive cloning, the root of the ethical problem is the total loss of biparentality 
(ie. the fact that every individual is conceived by the fusion of gametes of two different individuals, a 
male or “father”, and a female or “mother”). While biparentality is a key feature of advanced animals, 
asexual reproduction can only be found in the most primitive living beings. It is indeed hard to see how 
the promotion of asexual reproduction in humans could represent a progress for humankind. Rather, it 
seems well that it would be the most dramatic regression in history that the human species could ever 
suffer. But even leaving aside the purely biological perspective, it should be noted that the element of 
chance that characterizes the combination ―always original― of the genetic material of two progenitors 
has great moral relevance for the individuals themselves, as it is a precondition for a full and free self-
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discovery of one’s self (Jonas 1985: 182-94). Indeed, the cloned children are to some extent deprived of 
such a freedom, as the “model” of their sole progenitor is ―at least tacitly― imposed upon them by the 
mere fact that they have been deliberately conceived as a genetic copy of him or her.  
The basic objection to germline interventions for enhancement purposes is similar to the one levelled 
against cloning. Human genetic engineering would put at risk people’s freedom from deliberate 
predetermination of their genetic make up by third persons, and, in the long run, the principle of equality 
between generations. Such intergenerational freedom closely depends upon the condition that each 
individual’s features are more due to chance than to choice, to contingency than to human design. This is 
definitely a paradox because the idea of a human’s mastery of nature has always been regarded ―at least 
in the Western world― as an expression of the special place of humans on earth. But when that mastery 
reaches the basic features of the human condition itself, then it becomes problematic and even self-
contradictory run since it entails reducing future people to the condition of an object of the subjectivity of 
present people; human beings are at the same time subjects and objects, and the increase of human 
subjectivity leads strangely to an increase of human’s objectivation (Bayertz 1996: 88). Thus, it can be 
reasonably held that contingency in human reproduction (from which depends the non-predetermination 
of future people) is a value in itself that needs to be protected (Habermas 2003). This latter is an entirely 
novel idea in the history of moral philosophy, and stems from the awareness that the increasing 
biotechnological control over our own nature leads in reality not to a greater control over ourselves, but 
over those who will succeed us. And the exercise of such unprecedented power is in open conflict with the 
idea of intergenerational justice, which presupposes that the interests of future generations do not have 
less moral standing than the interests of present individuals.  
It is important to note that the human rights framework is powerless to face these new tremendous 
challenges to the identity of the human species because rights only belong to existing individuals, not to 
humankind as such or to future generations. In this regard, it is interesting to recall that during the 
intergovernmental discussions that took place between 1994 and 1997 at UNESCO aiming at producing 
an international instrument for the protection of future generations, all references to the supposed “rights” 
of future generations were removed from the initial draft after the ad-hoc commission of legal experts 
concluded that there are not such ‘rights’, since this concept always relates to existing persons. The 
instrument that was finally adopted on 11 November 1997 was entitled “Declaration on the 
Responsibilities of Present Generations Towards Future Generations” and avoids any mention of the 
“rights” of future generations. 
Therefore, it can be said that the claims sometimes made that there is a “right not to be conceived as 
a genetic copy of another person”, or a “right to inherit non-manipulated genetic information” are more 
rhetorical statements than conceptually consistent arguments. Indeed, how could people who do not exist, 
who do not even have been conceived, be today entitled to any rights? Humankind as such, including 
future generations, can probably be an object of obligations of the present generation, but certainly not a 
holder of rights (Mathieu 2000: 43). This explains why the notion of human dignity begins to be regarded 
as a kind of last barrier against the deliberate alteration of the basic features that characterize our common 
human condition (Annas et al. 2002).  
Three intergovernmental instruments illustrate this appeal to a broad understanding of human dignity 
to preserve the integrity of the human species: the UNESCO Declaration on the Human Genome and 
Human Rights of 1997, the Additional Protocol to the European Biomedicine Convention concerning 
Human Cloning of 1998, and the UN Declaration on Human Cloning of 2005. 
The UNESCO Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights of 1997 provides that the 
human genome “is the heritage of humanity” (Article 1). This notion is inspired by the concept of 
‘common heritage of humanity’ which aims to preserve the world’s natural and cultural resources for the 
benefit of humankind as a whole. According to the drafters of the Declaration, when applied to the human 
genome, this expression means, first, that genetic research engages the responsibility of the whole of 
humanity and that its results should benefit present and future generations (Gros Espiell 1999: 3); second, 
that the international community has a duty to preserve the integrity of the human species from improper 
manipulations that may endanger it (Kutukdjian 1999: 33). It is also interesting to note that the 1997 
Declaration directly appeals to the notion of human dignity (not to human rights) to condemn both 
reproductive cloning and germline interventions (Articles 11 and 24, respectively). 
The above mentioned European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine did not address the 
cloning issue because the final version of the document was adopted in November 1996, a few months 
before the announcement of the birth of the cloned sheep Dolly, which launched a worldwide debate on 
this matter. In response to this gap, the Member States of the Council of Europe decided to urgently adopt 
a specific Additional Protocol to the Convention in order to prohibit human cloning, which was finalized 
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in January 1998. The substantive reasons offered by the Protocol for the ban on human cloning are the 
following: a) it constitutes an “instrumentalisation of human beings,” which is “contrary to human 
dignity” (Preamble); b) it poses “serious difficulties of a medical, psychological and social nature” for the 
individuals involved (id.); c) it is “a threat to human identity,” because “it would give up the 
indispensable protection against the predetermination of the human genetic constitution by a third party” 
(Paragraph 3); d) it reduces human freedom because it is preferable “to keep the essentially random 
nature of the composition of their own genes” instead of having a “predetermined genetic make up” (id.). 
Regarding germline interventions, Article 13 of the Convention prohibits them on the grounds that “they 
may endanger not only the individual but the species itself,” according to the Explanatory Report to the 
Convention (Paragraph 89). 
Another intergovernmental instrument that is heavily drawn on a broad notion of human dignity is 
the UN Declaration on Human Cloning of 2005, by which Member States were called upon to adopt legal 
measures “to prohibit all forms of human cloning inasmuch as they are incompatible with human dignity 
and the protection of human life” (Paragraph d). It is interesting to see that the Declaration, which is only 
a two pages-document, includes no less than five explicit references to human dignity.  
It is noteworthy that none of the above mentioned instruments relating to bioethics (by the way, like 
all major international human rights instruments) include neither a definition of human dignity, nor an 
explanation of the grounds for forbidding some practices that are regarded as contrary to dignity. This 
lack of theoretical grounding is sometimes a source of misunderstandings on the part of non-legal 
scholars, who see it as a failure of such policy documents. For instance, criticizing the ban on human 
reproductive cloning included in the UNESCO Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 
the philosopher John Harris writes:  “the document contains not a single argument in support of this 
claim, nor any indication as to just what is meant by human dignity” (2008: 305). This kind of criticisms 
represent a mistake about the nature of international policy documents, which are not philosophical 
treatises aimed at discerning the truth so much as political statements resulting from compromise (Baylis 
2008: 323-39). In other words, intergovernmental instruments dealing with bioethics (or with whatever 
other issues) should not be assessed with purely academic criteria because they belong to another realm of 
human activity; they are not mainly a product of academic work, but rather a kind of compromise 
between a theoretical conceptualization made by experts and what is practically achievable given the 
political choices of governments (Andorno 2007). After all, the law has an eminently practical, not 
theoretical purpose; it aims to crystallize the existing consensus about a particular policy option in order 
to promote the common good, and not to define the ontology of things, nor to provide an ultimate 
theoretical justification of the choices made. 
 
3. Is a universal understanding of human dignity compatible with cultural diversity? 
 
Since the end of the Second World War, a universal understanding of human dignity goes hand in hand 
with the universality of human rights. Before 1945, the language of rights merely existed on the country 
specific level. Despite the unquestionable political and intellectual impact of the eighteenth century 
declarations of natural rights such as the American and French declarations, the dominant tendency was 
that of a merely contractual legal account of rights that resulted in positive law. With the creation of the 
United Nations in 1945 and the adoption of the UDHR and other subsequent international human rights 
instruments, the contractual account of rights was to some extent replaced with the idea of rights as 
universal moral standards necessary for human flourishing.  
As noted above, human dignity is presented in this new context as the foundational notion of rights, 
that is, as the ultimate rationale for the recognition of equal rights to every human being regardless of 
ethnic origin, nationality, social status, religion, sex, age, or any other particular feature. Human dignity 
and human rights are regarded as universal by definition, since they are attached to every human being 
qua human. If human rights were not universal, they were not human rights at all. It is noteworthy that 
human dignity and human rights could not even been thought if they were not understood as universal.  
Certainly, respect for human dignity and human rights rests upon the belief in the existence of a truly 
universal moral community comprising all human beings; it assumes that there are some moral truths that 
transcend boundaries between countries and cultures. Such respect embodies the conviction that “there 
are some things that should not be done to anybody, anywhere” (Midgley 1999: 160), or, according to 
Dworkin (1994: 236), that people must “never be treated in a way that denies the distinct importance of 
their own lives.” This categorical nature of human dignity raises the question whether it is compatible 
with respect for cultural diversity or whether both values are necessarily opposed.  
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My view on this is that human dignity and cultural diversity are not only ‘compatible’, but that 
dignity is the necessary precondition for the prima facie moral duty to respect the cultural specificities of 
each society. If every individual would not have any inherent (ie. universal) worthiness, how then could 
the particularities of the community he or she belongs to be worthy of respect? If a universal 
understanding of human dignity were wrong because of its universal character, then how could the 
principle of respect for other cultures (which is itself a universal principle) be justified? 
At this point it is helpful to remind that, contrary to what is sometimes asserted, cultural diversity and 
the existence of different moral standards are not at all new phenomena, but are as old as humanity. 
Ancient philosophers like Plato and Aristotle were perfectly aware of the existence of different and even 
opposed moral codes. Moreover, their search for universal ethical criteria emerged precisely as a 
consequence of the awareness of cultural diversity, not ignoring it; different moral views acted on them as 
a strong incentive to think about the objectivity of morality, and to try to discover the objective goods that 
may guide moral behaviour (Spaemann 1991: 14).  
At the same time, it should be emphasized that universal principles (ie. human dignity and human 
rights) do not need to be understood as rigid ones, but rather as standards that are flexible enough to be 
compatible with respect for the specificities or each culture. As a matter of fact, the human rights system 
allows some local variations, not in the substance, but in the form in which particular rights are 
implemented (Donnelly 1989: 109-42).  
Of course, it may happen that human rights and certain practices that could be seen as cultural 
traditions of a particular society are in conflict. In such cases, human rights must prevail. Practices such 
as inhuman or cruel punishments (ex. lapidation), female genital mutilation, child labour, the so-called 
“honour killing” of women who are regarded as having brought dishonour upon the family, and 
discrimination against people of lower castes, even if accepted by large part of a particular community, 
are seriously incompatible with most basic human rights and therefore do not deserve to be given due 
regard on the ground that they reflect the cultural specificities of that society. This is clear not only in 
international human rights law in general, but also in the specific field of bioethics: the UNESCO 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights of 2005 is a good example of this; while 
recognizing in Article 12 that cultural diversity should be given “due regard,” the Declaration makes it 
clear that its respect is subjected to the condition that it is not “contrary to human dignity, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms.”  
Thus, cultural diversity is not a synonymous for cultural relativism. Cultural diversity is a fact; 
cultural relativism is a theory about morality. Cultural diversity is a value in itself as it puts in evidence 
how societies develop differently across time and space depending on their specific historical 
circumstances, environmental factors, traditions, religion, etc. All these specificities lead to significant 
variations in the way societies organize themselves, and also in the way they conceptualize ethical norms 
and values. The cultural particularities of every society are worthy of respect, because they make part of 
its own identity and self-understanding. Far from necessarily being a source of conflict or tension 
between societies or ethnic groups, they are a precious asset of humankind that deserves to be preserved 
against the risks of a cultural homogeneization.  
On the other hand, cultural relativism claims that morality is merely a product of culture, and for this 
reason there are no objective moral truths, but only truths relative to specific cultural settings. According 
to this view, a practice may be good in one cultural setting and bad in another, but there are no practices 
that are intrinsically good or intrinsically bad; thus, there are no universal truths in ethics; the customs of 
each society is all that exist. Yet, cultural relativism is not as plausible as it may appear as a first sight. To 
show this it is helpful to consider the syllogism which is at the background of cultural relativistic 
positions (Rachels 1993): 
 
─ Different cultures have different moral standards (Premise 1) 
─ All standards cannot be simultaneously right (Premise 2) 
─ Therefore, there is no objective moral truth in morality (Conclusion) 
 
It is not hard to see that the conclusion does not logically follow from the premises. Even if the 
premise 1 is true (or true to some extent), the conclusion might be false because it deals with totally 
different matters. Premise 1 concerns what people think or believe (in some societies, people believe one 
thing; in other societies people believe something else; in some societies, people may think that degrading 
treatment of individuals of lower castes is right, in other societies, people may think that that practice is 
wrong). But the conclusion attempts to say something, not about what people think, but about what really 
is the case. In other words, from the mere fact that people may disagree about the rightness or wrongness 
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of a particular behavior (premise 1) does not follow that there is no objective truth in morality 
(conclusion); it could perfectly be that some practices are objectively wrong, and that the views 
supporting them are simply mistaken.  
 
4. Is the promotion of human dignity and human rights a form of Western cultural imperialism? 
 
One of the most common objections to the very idea of human dignity and human rights applying 
universally is that they embody a Western liberal-individualistic perspective and are therefore alien to 
other cultures. Attempting to impose respect for human rights standards on non-Western countries would 
be tantamount to cultural imperialism. This argument has also been made in the specific field of bioethics 
to object the human rights approach adopted by intergovernmental bodies. For instance, commenting on 
the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Human Rights and Bioethics of 2005, some scholars criticize the 
document on the ground that “human dignity and human rights, both strong features of European 
enlightenment philosophy, pervades this Declaration” (Schuklenk and Landman 2005). 
Although the philosophical controversy between universalists and relativists is too complex to be 
adequately covered in this chapter, some responses to above mentioned objection are immediately 
available. First of all, it is true that the current notion of human rights has its immediate origins in the 
insights of the European Enlightenment philosophers and in the political revolutions of the end of the 
eighteenth century, notably, the American and French Revolutions. However, this historical circumstance 
is not a good enough reason to discard the idea that people have inherent dignity and equal rights, just as 
it would not be enough to argue that Mozart or Bach were Europeans to deny the extraordinary beauty of 
their works. The relevant question is whether or not the notion that every human being has inherent 
dignity and rights makes sense and deserves to be promoted, no matter where this idea was conceptually 
developed. It can even be claimed that the current widespread conviction, well enshrined in international 
law, that people have basic rights simply by virtue of their humanity, and irrespective of ethnic origin, 
sex, nationality, religion, or social and economic status, is one of the major achievements of modern 
civilization, much more important than any scientific or technical development (Andorno 2007). In a few 
words, merely pointing to moral diversity and the presumed integrity of individual cultures does not, by 
itself, provide a philosophical justification for cultural relativism or a sufficient critique of universalism. 
It is indeed paradoxical that the most severe criticisms of the universality of human rights come from 
Western scholars. In this regard, the Indian-born economist and philosopher Amartya Sen (1998 40-3) 
points out that those criticisms are often based on a misconception of non-Western (largely Asian) 
societies, as if people in these countries had little or no interest in their rights and were only concerned 
with issues of social order and discipline (misconception which is of course well exploited by 
authoritarian regimes). In confirmation of Sen’s remark, it is interesting to mention that the main 
weakness that some Asian bioethicists see in the 2005 UNESCO Declaration is not the adoption of a 
human rights approach, but precisely the opposite: the fact of not having emphasized enough the 
universality of human dignity and human rights…! (Jing- Bao 2005; Asai and Oe 2005). 
In addition, it should not be forgotten that, after all, international human rights law has been 
developed along the last six decades by representatives of the most diverse countries and cultures and 
therefore it is hard to claim that it intends to impose one cultural standard. Rather, it can be said that it 
seeks to promote a minimum legal standard of protection for all people in our common world. As such, 
universal human rights can be reasonably seen as the “hard-won consensus of the international 
community,” and not as the cultural imperialism of any particular region or set of traditions (Ayton-
Shenker 1995: 2).  
The previous remarks do not intend to ignore the fact that in many Western nations there has been an 
excessive emphasis on rights and freedoms for the individual, sometimes to the detriment of family and 
community values, which are of paramount importance to most non-Western (mainly Asian and African) 
societies. However, it would be equally fair to say that international law has made substantial efforts over 
the last decades to be more attuned to the communal and collective basis of many non-Western countries. 
This was done, in particular, through the development of the ‘second generation of rights’ that are 
included in the abovementioned International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, such as the right to 
education, the right to a fair remuneration, the right to healthy working conditions, the right to health care, 
the protection of the family and children, etc. This tendency toward a broader understanding of human 
rights has been even further developed with the ‘third generation of human rights,’ the so-called ‘rights of 
solidarity,’ which include the right to development, to peace, to self-determination, and to a healthy 
environment. This is to say that, although human rights remain philosophically grounded within an 
individualist moral doctrine, there can be no doubt that serious attempts have been made by the 
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international community to adequately apply them to more communally oriented societies (Andorno 
2009). 
In any case, the truth is that today the objections to the universality of human rights have lost much 
of their practical significance because virtually all states accept the authority of international human rights 
law. The six core international human rights treaties (on civil and political rights, economic, social, and 
cultural rights, racial discrimination, women, torture, and children) have an average 166 ratifying states, 
which represents a truly impressive 85% ratification rate (Volodin 2009: 16-24).  
 
Conclusion 
 
Since 1948, the notion of human dignity operates as a central organizing principle of the international 
human rights system. It not only plays a foundational role by offering the ultimate reason why do people 
have rights, but also helps identifying those practices that are unacceptable as they entail treating people 
in a way that denies the distinct importance of their lives, or instrumentalize them in a way that imply 
using them as mere means to another’s ends.  
Regarding bioethical issues, respect for the dignity of every individual has acquired in the last decade 
the status of an overarching principle which is called to guide the whole biomedical field. By the end of 
the 1990s, it began also to be used with a secondary or extended meaning, which relates to the integrity 
and identity of humankind as such and to the promotion of intergenerational justice.  
Certainly, there is no always unanimity between countries (and within each country) about the 
concrete implications of human dignity, especially regarding those medical practices that operate at the 
edges of life. However, divergent results in the most controversial issues may not necessarily mean that a 
universal conception of dignity does not exist, but suggest only that a universal understanding of dignity 
does not exist at the margins (McCrudden 2008: 711). 
This paper has basically tried to demonstrate that human dignity and human rights, which are by 
definition universal, are not in conflict with respect for cultural diversity, and that this is also valid in the 
field of bioethics. The circumstance that bioethical issues are closely linked to the deepest socio-cultural 
and religious values of every society is not an obstacle to the formulation of universal principles. Quite 
the contrary. Precisely because bioethics is close to the most cherished aspirations of people, and since 
people are essentially the same in the US and in Guinea, in France and in Japan, it is not that difficult to 
develop some minimal common standards. Human dignity plays in this regard a unifying role by 
reminding that all human beings are entitled to some basic goods, and that there are things that should not 
be done to anybody, anywhere. From this perspective, dignity is the most valuable bridge between 
cultures that we have.  
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